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In this paper, we examine the role of insurance coverage in explaining the generic
competition paradox in a two-stage game involving a single producer of brand-name
drugs and n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs. Independently of brand
loyalty, which some studies rely upon to explain the paradox, we show that heterogene-
ity in insurance coverage may result in higher prices of brand-name drugs following
generic entry. With market segmentation based on insurance coverage present in both
the pre- and post-entry stages, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs are
highly substitutable and the market is quite pro￿table but does not have to arise when
the two types of drugs are highly di⁄erentiated. However, with market segmentation
occuring only after generic entry, the paradox can arise when the two types of drugs
are weakly substituables, provided, however, that the industry is not very pro￿table.
In both cases, that is, when market segmentation is present in the pre-entry stage and
when it is not, the paradox becomes more likely to arise as the market expands and/or
insurance companies decrease deductables applied on the purchase of generic drugs.
JEL Classi￿cations: L11, L13, I12
Keywords: brand-name pricing, generic entry, generic competition paradox, health
insurance.
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The development and growth of the generic pharmaceutical industry over the past 25 years
has come in response to rising healthcare costs. In 2004, healthcare costs represented 15.3
percent of GDP in the United States, the highest share among OECD countries, followed
by Switzerland (11.6 percent), Germany (10.9 percent), and France (10.5 percent), all above
the OECD average of 8.9 percent (OECD, 2007). Private expenditures per capita were also
the highest in the United States, more than double the private expenditures per capita of
any other OECD country. For all OECD countries, the rate of growth of health spending per
capita increased over the period 1999-2004 by more than 5 percent per year. With pharma-
ceutical expenditures representing 10 to 25 percent of health expenditures (OECD), many
countries have attempted to promote the use of generic drugs in a variety of ways in order
to keep healthcare costs down while maintaining or even increasing accessibility to pharma-
ceuticals and retaining incentives to invest in innovation and research and development.
In 1984, the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as
the Waxman-Hatch Act, was introduced in the U.S. in order to improve generic competition
by lowering barriers to entry for generic drugs and to increase patent terms for new drugs
delayed by complicated and time-consuming approval procedures of the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), the agency responsible for the safety and e¢ cacy of drugs. Under
this legislation, (duplicative) testing for generic drugs was eliminated and replaced by the
requirement that an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) be submitted by generic
entrants demonstrating the equivalence between their products and the original (brand-
name) drugs. Not surprisingly, the entry of generic drugs into the pharmaceutical market
intensi￿ed dramatically following the introduction of the Waxman-Hatch Act, and as a re-
sult of the expiration of patents on many high-sales-volume brand-name drugs (Frank and
Salkever, 1997). In response to the increased market share of generic drugs and lower prices
of pharmaceuticals overall, the prices of brand-name drugs did not fall consistently with the
predictions of traditional market entry models; instead, they were often observed to increase.
This phenomenon is often referred to as the generic competition paradox, or GCP (Scherer,
1993).
1The ￿rst evidence of the paradox was presented by Wagner and Du⁄y (1988) who found
substantial price increases associated with entry despite signi￿cant decreases in generic prices
among top selling name brand drugs. Several other instances of support for the paradox were
provided in subsequent studies, including those by Grabowski and Vernon (1992), Frank and
Salkever (1997), Perlo⁄et al. (1995), and, to a lesser extent, Caves et al. (1991). Grabowski
and Vernon, using data on 18 major drugs in the mid-1980s, showed that price increases for
name brands increased on average by 7 percent after entry and continued to increase in the
following year. Frank and Salkever utilized data on the patent expiration of 45 drugs facing
competition for the ￿rst time between 1984 and 1987, and found that, although signi￿cant
market share was lost upon entry by brand-name producers, the price of their product
generally increased. Similarly, Perlo⁄ et al. showed brand-name price increases using data
from the mid-1980s from the U.S. anti-ulcer drug market. Although Caves et al. did not
observe price increases in their study of 30 drugs between 1976 and 1987, they found prices to
decrease by only small amounts following entry (2 percent on patent loss, although this loss
increased with the number of entrants) and by far less than the price decrease experienced
by the entrants. In other studies, including the work by Wiggins and Maness (1998) on 98
anti-infectives from 1984 to 1990, no evidence in support of the paradox was detected.
Traditional oligopolistic models of entry suggest that the increased competition caused by
generic entry should drive prices down for all ￿rms, as illustrated by a move from monopoly
to duopoly with homogeneous goods. While most, if not all, models attempting to ex-
plain the paradox would suggest that average prices fall after entry, the standard models
do not explain why the price charged by the incumbent ￿rm could increase after entry.
Several explanations have been proposed to theoretically support the empirical ￿nding that
prices of brand-name drugs increase after entry. For example, but outside of the realm of
the pharmaceutical industry, models of entry-induced price increases in oligopolistic or mo-
nopolistically competitive markets, including those by Satterthwaite (1979), Salop (1979),
Rosenthal (1990), suggest that economies of scale or speci￿c demand curve changes can lead
to post-entry price increases.1 Due to the nature of pharmaceutical production, economies of
1Davis, Murphy and Topel (2004) suggest that di⁄erentiation and segmentation may lead to price increases
after entry beyond drugs to other products such as Microsoft￿ s Windows.
2scale are not typically present and therefore this is not a likely explanation for the paradox.
However, several papers employ changes in the elasticity of demand to explain the paradox,
including the brand-loyalty models of Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992),
Frank and Salkever (1997), and Kamien and Zang (1999).2 In these models, exogenous seg-
mentation of the market occurs upon entry, as one group of consumers is price sensitive while
another is not.3 The segmentation is exogenous in the sense that the individual groups exist
separately in the market prior to entry but the brand name producer is not permitted to
choose whether or not they want to serve only one group prior to entry, and the size of each
group remains constant before and after entry.
Other studies attempting to explain the paradox introduce price stickiness into models
due to imperfectly informed doctors (Bhattacharya and Vogt, 2003), product di⁄erentiation
with collusion or price competition (Perlo⁄et al, 1995), or quality di⁄erences (Berndt et al.,
1993; Griliches and Cockbrun, 1994). Bhattacharya and Vogt argue that doctors￿stock of
knowledge about the presence and e¢ cacy of new generics evolves slowly and is manipulated
by producers through advertising. Perlo⁄ et al. show that the paradox can occur when
products are signi￿cantly di⁄erentiated in product space. Pre-entry, the ￿rm lowers its price
to serve segments of the market located far away from its product in its characteristics,
but increases its price once entry occurs and those consumers switch to the entrant￿ s prod-
uct. Product location is exogenous, and the paradox is not possible for cases in which the
entrant￿ s product and the incumbent￿ s product are closely related (little product di⁄erenti-
ation). Berndt et al. and Griliches and Cockbrun have that price increases are generated by
quality improvements, and that prices increase over the life of a product (although increase
more slowly post-entry).
In this paper, we combine some of the features of the models of previous studies, including
product di⁄erentiation and brand loyalty, but focus on the role of insurance coverage in the
segmentation of the market. Speci￿cally, we examine the endogenous segmentation of the
market by the brand-name producer, both before and after entry, to determine whether or
2Kamien and Zang focus on the introduction of generics by brand-name ￿rms prior to entry rather than
on the segmentation by brand loyalty itself.
3Exogenous segmentation by physicians based on insurance coverage is recently considered by Ferrara
and Kong (2008).
3not insurance coverage can explain the paradox, and its relation to the other theories of the
literature.
The relevance of insurance in pricing decisions has empirical support. Hellerstein (1994),
for example, using prescription data from the eight largest therapeutic drug classes, describes
how most individual doctors prescribe both brand-name and generic drugs (suggesting that
a lack of awareness or knowledge is not driving the prescription decision). Furthermore,
doctors with higher fractions of Medicaid, Medicare, HMO, and privately insured patients
are more likely to prescribe generics, although the links are not particularly strong (or even
negative) for certain drug classes. Pavcnik (2002) suggests that brand-name pricing is very
sensitive to out-of-pocket expenditures, and estimates, using data from Germany, that the
price adjustment to an exogenous change in insurance coverage ranges between 10 percent
and 26 percent. In a cross-country study, Danzon and Chao (2000) show that the e⁄ect of
generic competition on brand-name prices depends on the insurance coverage and pricing
regime, and conclude that countries with fee pricing (like the U.S.) tend to experience large
decreases but countries with strict reimbursement regulation and insurance (like France,
Italy, and Japan) tend to experience price increases.4
In the present analysis, we construct a model in which consumers di⁄er on the basis of
coverage, and the brand-name producer can choose, through its price for the brand-name
drug and taking into account the impact of its own decisions on generic pricing, which
consumers it wants to target and which consumers it wants to leave out of the market
(pre-entry) or to the generic producers (post-entry). The inclusion of a parameter, q, into
the utility function describing consumers￿preferences, which captures the perceived quality
di⁄erential between brand-name and generic drugs, allows for a separation between the
price e⁄ects of brand loyalty as re￿ ected in q and the price e⁄ects of segmentation induced
by insurance coverage heterogeneity. We thus derive conditions under which the generic
competition paradox occurs in instances in which brand loyalty (or the perceived quality
di⁄erential) alone does not give rise to price increases for brand-name drugs when generic
drugs are introduced so that the paradox can only be attributed to insurance coverage
4Other papers, such as that by Anis (1992), focus on the e⁄ectiveness of a reimbursement regime as a
solution to the principal-agent problem in doctors￿prescription decisions.
4considerations. In the context of the model, we revisit the brand loyalty argument to explain
the paradox and show that brand loyalty does not always yield increases in the price of brand-
name drugs after generic entry; whether brand loyalty leads to price increases depends upon
other parameters of the model such as the degree of product di⁄erentiation, production costs,
and the willingness to pay for pharmaceuticals.
When the brand loyalty argument does not apply and the market is segmented on the
basis of insurance coverage (at least after the introduction of generic drugs), we show that
the price of brand-name drugs can increase following generic entry at low levels of prod-
uct di⁄erentiation and can decrease at high levels of product di⁄erentiation. The extent of
substitutability between brand-name and generic drugs is not by itself a key factor in de-
termining whether the GCP arises and does not necessarily involve unambiguous e⁄ects on
the likelihood of the paradox, as in Perlo⁄ et al. (1995); instead, a combination of product
di⁄erentiation and market pro￿tability, along with market size and preferential treatment of
purchases of generic drugs by insurance companies, is a stronger determinant of when the
paradox is likely to emerge so that lower product di⁄erentation can support the paradox and
higher product di⁄erentation can yield no paradox.
When brand-name and generic drugs are close substitutes, the producer of brand-name
drugs responds to generic entry by supplying to fewer consumers (those who have better in-
surance coverage) and can thus charge a higher price; such a strategy becomes less appealing
as the market becomes less pro￿table so that the GCP is more likely to occur when the two
types of drugs are not very di⁄erentiated but the market is very pro￿table. What happens
if brand-name and generic drugs are not close substitutes depends on whether segmenta-
tion occurs prior to generic entry: if it does, the producer of brand-name drugs responds to
generic entry by supplying to more consumers and must thus charge a lower price so that
the paradox does not occur when the two types of drugs are highly di⁄erentiated and is even
less likely as the market becomes more pro￿table; if it does not, it responds to generic entry
by supplying to fewer consumers (moving away from providing drugs to the entire market)
especially when the market is less pro￿table so that the GCP is more likely to occur at high
levels of product di⁄erentation but low levels of market pro￿tability. The larger the market
and/or the lower the deductable insurance companies apply on the purchase of generic drugs
5relative to the deductable on the purchase of brand-name drugs, the stronger the incentive
to segment is and thus the more likely the GCP arises.
We structure the remainder of the paper as follows: in section 2, we introduce the model
and derive the equilibrium derived before and after generic entry both in the absence of
health insurance coverage considerations (that is, consumers are homogenous) in sub-section
2.1 and when consumers di⁄er in their health insurance coverage in sub-section 2.2; in section
3, we provide a numerical example; in section 4, we give concluding remarks.
2 The Model
In this paper, the pharmaceutical market is characterized by two products (the brand-
name drug, produced by a monopolist, and its generic substitute, produced by n quantity-
competing ￿rms) and consumers di⁄ering in their insurance coverage as captured by ￿, which
is uniformly distributed over the interval [￿;1], with ￿ > 0. Speci￿cally, ￿ denotes the fraction
of expenditures on drugs a consumer pays out of his/her pocket with (1 ￿ ￿) thus re￿ ecting
the covered portion; hence, if ￿ is equal to 1, the consumer has no coverage. As the lower
bound of ￿ is ￿, 100 percent coverage is not available; in other words, a co-payment or de-
ductible is always present and is de￿ned as a fraction of total expenditures as opposed to
some ￿xed amount that is independent of the level of spending. To account for a di⁄erential
co-payment or deductible system which favours the purchase of generic drugs,5 the parame-
ter t is introduced, with t 2 (0;1), to capture the reduction in deductible or co-payment
a consumer is entitled to if he/she buys generic drugs as opposed to brand-name drugs.6
Social insurance systems in France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom, and
5Although the practice of reference-based pricing (the ability of a drug coverage plan to only reimburse a
patient up to the amount of the lowest cost comparable drug available in the market) is quite well documented
for public drug coverage plans, its existence is rather obscure among private providers of drug coverage
plans. Most private insurance providers in the U.S. do in fact serve patients through their employers. As
drug coverage bene￿ts can be an important premise for an employee when considering which company to
work for, employers would need to be competitive; the expectation is then that the private drug insurance
providers would also need to be competitive and ensure its clients that they can o⁄er a better coverage at a
reasonable cost. Better coverage can naturally be interpreted as coverage for brand-name drugs as well as
generic drugs. We do not consider alternate forms of regulation, such as price cap measures. For an empirical
study of the e⁄ects of price caps and reference pricing on o⁄-patent drugs, see Brekke et al. (2009).
6The consumer with ￿ = 1 has no coverage for brand-name drugs but a coverage equal to t per dollar
spent on generic drugs.
6private insurance policies in Canada and the U.S. typically include co-payments with levels
dependent upon whether the brand-name or generic good is purchased (Danzon and Chao,
2000). For example, most private insurance plans in the U.S. (83 percent in 2003, up from
25 percent in 1993) include a higher reimbursement for generic drugs (Dietz, 2004), and the
brand-name co-payment exceeds the generic co-payment in the social insurance system in
Germany.7
As in Caminal and Vives (1999), the utility function of a representative consumer is given
by











where x0 represents units of a competitively produced numeraire good, xb and xg denote
the consumption levels of brand-name and generic drugs, and ￿, ￿, ￿, and q are positive
parameters with ￿ > ￿, ￿ > (￿ ￿ ￿)q, and q ￿ 1. Speci￿cally, the ratio ￿=￿ represents the
degree of product di⁄erentiation so that the two products are perfect substitutes if ￿=￿ = 1
and independent if ￿=￿ = 0. While it may be that the brand-name and the generic types
of drugs constitute the same product, there are several options available to producers to
di⁄erentiate them. For example, producers may di⁄erentiate on the basis of taste, delivery
system, oral dosage forms (capsules, coated pills, etc.), unit dosage packaging, and pill shape
(Hurwitz and Caves, 1988); hence, we rule out the possibility that the two types of drugs
are perfect substitutes, that is, ￿ > ￿ or ￿=￿ < 1. The parameter q represents instead
the quality di⁄erential between brand-name and generic drugs as perceived by consumers
so that an increase in q triggers an increase in the marginal willingness to pay for brand-
name drugs (i.e., ￿+(￿ ￿ ￿)q) but a decrease in the marginal willingness to pay for generic
drugs (i.e., ￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)q). The parameter q can be interpreted as a measure of (or proxy
for) brand loyalty since consumers￿attachment to a particular brand typically stems from
a perception of quality superiority. In essence, q captures the presence and the extent
of imperfect information about the quality of generic drugs so that, even in instances in
which the two types of drugs have very similar characteristics (that is, ￿=￿ is close to unity),
7￿Tiered￿ systems, with di⁄erent prices for generic formulary drugs, brand-name formulary drugs, and
non-formulary drugs, have also been increasing in popularity over time (Dietz, 2004).
7consumers may be reluctant to switching to the less expensive type when it becomes available,
thus remaining loyal to the brand-name type, if they perceive it to be of inferior quality. As
it is shown later, the inclusion of q into the utility function allows for a separation between
the price e⁄ects of brand loyalty and the price e⁄ects of insurance coverage heterogeneity.
The budget constraint of type-￿ consumer is given by
m = x0 + ￿pbxb + (1 ￿ t)￿pgxg; (2)
where m is income, pb and pg are the price levels of the brand-name and generic drugs,
￿ is the insurance factor or a parameter that captures the amount of insurance coverage
for brand-name drugs, and t is the additional coverage on the purchase of generic drugs.
A type-￿ consumer thus pays ￿ for each dollar spent on brand-name drugs but ￿(1 ￿ t)
for each dollar spent on generic drugs, with 0 < t < 1, so that lower values of ￿ indicate
greater insurance coverage. Income is then divided between spending on the numeraire good,
uncovered spending on brand-name drugs, and (if available) uncovered spending on generic
drugs.










f[￿ ￿ (￿ ￿ ￿)q] ￿ (1 ￿ t)￿pg ￿ ￿xbg; (4)
which can be re-written as
xb =








[￿￿pb ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ t)￿pg] (5)
and
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> 0 by the second-order conditions.
In deriving market demand functions, three cases are considered:
￿ CASE A (pre-entry, no segmentation): generic drugs are not available and brand-name
drugs are supplied to the entire continuum of consumers, that is, 1 ￿ ￿;
8￿ CASE B (pre-entry, segmentation): generic drugs are not available and brand-name
drugs are supplied to a segment of the continuum, that is, ￿B ￿ ￿ where ￿ < ￿B < 1
with ￿B endogenously chosen;8
￿ CASE C (post-entry, segmentation): generic drugs are available to the entire continuum
of consumers and brand-name drugs are supplied to a segment of the continuum, that
is, ￿C￿￿ where ￿ < ￿C < 1 with ￿C endogenously chosen.
With the subscripts or superscripts A, B, and C referring to the three cases and capital
letters denoting aggregate levels, the market demand functions for brand-name drugs in
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8When generic drugs are not available (CASES A and B), type-￿ consumer￿ s utility function, upon
incorporation of his/her budget constraint, is given by










9When segmentation occurs (CASES B and C), the price of brand-name drugs is such that
brand-name drugs are not purchased by consumers with ￿ 2 [￿B;1] in CASE B and by
consumers with ￿ 2 [￿C;1] in CASE C; that is, in each of the two segmentation cases,
individuals with low insurance coverage (high ￿) are ￿priced out of the market￿for brand-
name drugs.
To be able to more accurately understand the relevance of incorporating di⁄erential health
insurance coverages into the analysis of pricing responses to generic entry, the equilibrium
is also derived in the absence of insurance considerations when only brand-name drugs are
available (CASE D) and when both brand-name and generic drugs are available (CASE E);
in both cases, the entire market consisting of 1 ￿ ￿ consumers is served. Hence, for CASE
D, the market demand function for brand-name drugs is
X
D







and, for CASE E, the market demand functions for brand-name and generic drugs are
X
E
b = (1 ￿ ￿)
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2.1 The Equilibrium with Homogenous Consumers
When consumers enjoy the same health insurance coverage, they can be assumed to have
no coverage without any loss of generality (that is, ￿ = 1). With homogenous consumers,
market segmentation is impossible and drugs￿producers supply to the entire market of 1￿￿
consumers. Under the assumption that the marginal cost of production, denoted by c, is
constant with c < ￿, two cases are considered: CASE D in which only brand-name drugs
are produced; CASE E in which both brand-name and generic drugs are produced.
102.1.1 CASE D: No Generic Drugs, Full Market Coverage, and No Insurance
Coverage
In the absence of insurance coverage, the pro￿t function, upon substitution for pD
b from (11),

























2.1.2 CASE E: Generic Drugs, Full Market Coverage, and No Insurance Cov-
erage
When generic drugs become available, the supply side of the pharmaceutical market is char-
acterized by n quantity-competing ￿rms which produce generic drugs and a monopolist which
produces brand-name drugs. Each ￿rm faces the same constant marginal cost (c) indepen-
dently of the type of drugs it produces. The model is then a two-stage game: in the ￿rst
stage, the monopolist chooses how many types of consumers to supply to; in the second
stage, the n producers of generic drugs engage in Cournot competition taking the price of
brand-name drugs as given. To derive the equilibrium, the second stage of the model is
considered ￿rst to obtain the price of generic drugs as a function of the price of brand-name
drugs; upon substitution of this price into the pro￿t function of the monopolist, the price of
the brand-name drugs is determined.
The Second Stage of the Game: Generic Firms￿Cournot Competition Using (13)
to obtain pE
g and that XE
g = nxE








































11The First Stage of the Game: Brand-Name Firm￿ s Price Setting Upon substi-
tution for pE
g from (17) into (12) and rearrangement to obtain pE
b , the monopolist￿ s pro￿t





































2 ￿ ￿2￿ : (19)
2.1.3 Comparative Analysis of Prices
In the absence of insurance coverage, a comparison of the prices of brand-name drugs before
and after generic entry (that is, pD
b and pE
b ) leads to the following proposition:






When heterogeneity in health insurance coverage is ignored, the price of brand-name drugs
increases following the introduction of generic drugs provided that the perceived quality
di⁄erential between the two types of drugs is su¢ ciently large. More precisely, ceteris paribus,
the lower the degree of product di⁄erentiation between brand-name and generic drugs (￿=￿)
and/or the higher the perceived quality di⁄erential between brand-name and generic drugs
(q), the more likely it is for the price of brand-name drugs to increase in response to the




Although consumers are assumed to be homogenous so that no segmentation can occur,
the inclusion of q into the utility function allows for a re-consideration of the brand loyalty
argument proposed by Caves et al. (1991), Grabowski and Vernon (1992), and Frank and
Salkever (1997) to explain the generic competition paradox. In essence, brand loyalty arises
because consumers perceive brand-name products to be of better quality; by capturing con-
sumers￿perception of the quality superiority of the brand-name drugs, q does re￿ ect, and is
12thus a proxy for, brand loyalty. The above proposition therefore supports the brand loyalty
story to justify the price increase for brand-name drugs when competition in the pharma-
ceutical market intensi￿es as a result of generic entry. If brand loyalty as captured by q
is signi￿cant relative to some measure of market pro￿tability as captured by c=￿ and/or
relative to the degree of product di⁄erentiation between the two types of drugs (that is,
￿=￿), the generic competition paradox is likely to occur. Interestingly, the presence of brand
loyalty is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for the paradox; in other words, it is
possible for generic entry to entail a non-positive change in the price of brand-name drugs
even when consumers exhibit a high degree of brand loyalty provided that the two types of
drugs are close substitutes (high ￿=￿) and/or the industry is more pro￿table (low c=￿).9
2.2 The Equilibrium with Heterogenous Consumers
When health insurance coverage is included into the model so that consumers can be allowed
to di⁄er, the price e⁄ects of market segmentation based on insurance coverage can be assessed
in instances in which brand loyalty is insu¢ cient to generate the GCP. For completeness,
in the absence of generic drugs, the pro￿t-maximizing problem the monopolist producing
brand-name drugs faces is considered both when the entire market of 1 ￿ ￿ consumers is
covered (CASE A), in which case the choice variable is Xb, and when market segmentation
based on insurance coverage occurs (CASE B), in which case the choice variable is ￿B (that
is, the lowest acceptable coverage for the purchase of brand-name drugs). The market-
segmentation case is examined when generic drugs are not available to separate between the
e⁄ect (on the price of brand-name drugs) of market segmentation and the e⁄ect of generic
entry through market segmentation.
In the presence of generic drugs, the producer of brand-name drugs moves ￿rst and
decides on how to segment the market or how many types of consumers to supply to (that
is, it chooses ￿C, with ￿ < ￿C < 1, so that only ￿C ￿ ￿ consumers buy brand-name drugs or
consumers with ￿ < ￿C). The n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs move next
9The parameter ￿ is a determinant of the maximum willingness to pay for drugs. The higher the ￿, the
more consumers are willing to pay for drugs. Hence, the di⁄erence between ￿ and c is a measure of the
surplus ￿rms can potentially extract from consumers and the ratio of c to ￿ is thus a measure of market
pro￿tability, with a lower ratio corresponding to a larger gap between ￿ and c.
13and, given the price of brand-name drugs, determine how much to produce taking the entire
continuum of consumers into account, of which ￿C ￿ ￿ buy both types of drugs and 1 ￿ ￿C
buy only generic drugs.
2.2.1 CASE A: No Generic Drugs and Full Market Coverage
Substituting for pA

































The higher the marginal willingness to pay for drugs (￿) and/or the higher the marginal
production cost (c) and/or the larger the market (1￿￿), the higher the price of brand-name
drugs is. The relation between pD
b and pA









hence, the presence of varying degrees of coverage results in an increase in the price of
brand-name drugs when generic drugs are not available in the market and the entire market
is serviced. Insurance coverage e⁄ectively reduces the out-of-pocket cost of healthcare, thus
increasing the willingness to pay for healthcare and enabling the monopolist to sell more at
a higher price.
2.2.2 CASE B: No Generic Drugs and Partial Market Coverage
In this case, the producer of brand-name drugs supplies to only a segment of the market;
speci￿cally, it sets pB
b such that type-￿B consumer buys nothing. From footnote 8, the type-




￿ so that pB
b = ￿
￿B.
Upon substitution for pB














































































(1+￿) > 0. The only parameters a⁄ecting ￿B are ￿ and
the ratio of c to ￿, which is relabeled as f with 0 < f < 1. In particular, comparative statics
lead to the following results:
Proposition 2 The higher ￿ and/or the lower c=￿, the larger ￿B is and the smaller pB
b is.
A higher ￿ corresponds to a worsening in the best available insurance coverage, which is
equivalent to a decrease in the size of the market; a lower f, where f = c=￿, corresponds
to an increase in market pro￿tability. Hence, a decrease in the market size (￿ ") induces
the monopolist to provide brand-name drugs to consumers with lower insurance coverage
(￿B "), thus charging a lower price for brand-name drugs (pB
b #). The segment of the market
the monopolist supplies to may increase or decrease depending on the value of the product
between ￿ and f; speci￿cally, the segment increases at low values of ￿f (and vice versa).
Furthermore, a decrease in market pro￿tability (f ") induces the monopolist to supply to
fewer types of consumers, or to supply to consumers with better insurance coverage (￿B #),
and to charge a higher price for brand-name drugs (pB
b ").
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10For ￿B > ￿, the condition that ￿
c > ￿ is satis￿ed as ￿ > c and ￿ < 1:
15For ￿f < 3
p
2 ￿ 4, the increase in ￿B is larger than the increase in ￿ so that, overall, the
monopolist ends up servicing more types of consumers. From footnote 8, the maximum
consumer surplus that could be extracted from type-￿ consumer at a constant marginal cost
of c is given by ￿2 (1 ￿ ￿f)
2 =2￿￿, which is a decreasing function of ￿, so that (1 ￿ ￿f)
2
is equal to the ratio of consumer surplus at c to consumer surplus at zero marginal cost
under marginal cost pricing. In other words, (1 ￿ ￿f)
2 provides a measure of the loss in the
realizable bene￿t of servicing type-￿ consumer when production entails a positive marginal







￿ 0:58 (or the consumer surplus
that can be extracted from type-￿ consumer at c is at least 58 percent of the consumer
surplus that can be extracted at zero marginal cost),
@￿B
@￿ > 1 and more types of consumers
buy brand-name drugs; that is, the monopolist chooses to supply to more types of consumers
in response to a decrease in market size or a worsening in the best insurance coverage. From
(27), as f decreases, the loss in the surplus that can be extracted from the consumer with
no coverage (￿ = 1) when production is costly decreases, thus inducing the monopolist to
service more types of consumers.11
2.2.3 CASE C: Generic Drugs and Partial Market Coverage
When generic drugs become available, the model involves a two-stage game with one producer
of brand-name drugs and n producers of generic drugs: in the ￿rst stage, the segment of the
market which buys both types of drugs and the price of brand-name drugs are determined;
in the second stage, the price of generic drugs is determined.
The Second Stage of the Game: Generic Firms￿Cournot Competition The pro￿t
















2[￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)q](￿ + ￿)



















11For ￿ = 1, the maximum extractable consumer surplus at c as a ratio of the maximum extractable
consumer surplus at zero marginal cost is in fact given by (1 ￿ f)
2 so that 1￿(1 ￿ f)
2 = f (2 ￿ f) gives the
percentage of the maximum willingness to pay of the consumer with no coverage at zero marginal cost that
is lost when marginal cost is a positive constant equal to c.





n and the market-clearing price of generic drugs as a function of the price of
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The First Stage of the Game: Brand-Name Firm￿ s Price Setting With ￿C denoting
the insurance parameter segmenting the market between consumers buying both types of













with respect to ￿C taking into account how pC
g responds to pC




[￿ + (￿ + ￿)q](￿ ￿ ￿)
￿￿C
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from (5) to ensure that type-￿C consumer does not buy brand-name drugs. The condition
for an interior solution to the above maximization problem can then be expressed as
A￿
2

























B = 4￿ [￿ + (￿ + ￿)q](￿ ￿ ￿)￿ > 0: (36)
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with ￿C as in (34).
172.2.4 Comparative Analysis of Market Segmentation and Price Setting
In order to isolate the contribution of incorporating heterogenous health insurance coverages
to explaining the generic competition paradox, the brand loyalty argument as above de￿ned
is assumed away. In particular, the brand loyalty parameter (q) is set equal to
￿￿(￿￿c)
(2￿￿￿)(￿2￿￿2)
such that the price of brand-name drugs is not a⁄ected by generic entry in the absence of
heterogenous health insurance coverage (that is, pD
b = pE
b ).
With s denoting the value of ￿=￿, that is, the degree of product di⁄erentiation between
brand-name and generic drugs, which ranges between 0 (products are independent) and 1
(products are perfect substitutes),12 and f denoting the value of c=￿, for 0 <
2￿
(1+￿) < f < 1,
the above condition becomes q =
s￿(1￿f)
￿(2￿s)(1￿s2) and the price of brand-name drugs in CASE
C (that is, when generic drugs are available to the entire market but brand-name drugs are















































N = 4￿(1 + ￿)[(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) + s(1 ￿ f)] > 0 (40)
and
D = f (1 + ￿)(2 ￿ s)
￿




+ 2s[(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) ￿ s(1 ￿ f)]; (41)
which must be negative for an interior solution of ￿C.13 The extent of segmentation as
captured by ￿C depends not only upon ￿ and f, as in CASE B, but also on t and s. The
speci￿cs of this dependence are given in the following proposition:
12More precisely, 0 ￿ s < 1 as, by assumption, ￿ > ￿.





and fmax = min(fH;1).
See appendix for details on fL and fH.
18Proposition 3 A decrease in t increases ￿C as does an increase in ￿. An increase in f is
likely to reduce ￿C while an increase in s reduces ￿C at high values of s and increases it at
low values of s.
As the additional deductible on the purchase on generic drugs decreases (t #) and/or the
market size decreases (￿ "), the monopolist opts to increase ￿C, thus supplying to more
types of consumers. Furthermore, as the cost of producing drugs increases (c ") or the
willingness to pay for drugs decreases (￿ #), causing f, which is de￿ned as c
￿, to increase,
the producer of brand-name drugs chooses to lower ￿C, thus supplying to fewer types of
consumers, independently of the degree of product di⁄erentiation between brand-name and
generic drugs (i.e., s), provided that the additional insurance coverage for generic drugs (i.e.,
t) is not su¢ ciently small. Finally, as the degree of product di⁄erentiation between the two
types of drugs increases (s "), the monopolist supplies to more (fewer) consumers when the
degree of product di⁄erentiation is lower (larger) and the industry is pro￿table (i.e., f is low);
for a given t and ￿, the relevant range of high (low) values of s over which the monopolist
supplies to fewer (more) consumers in response to an increase in s gets narrower (wider) as
f increases up to some critical level and vice versa as f increases past this critical level.




f (1 + ￿)(2 ￿ s)sN







C ￿ 2￿s[(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) ￿ s(1 ￿ f)] N
D2
￿(1 + ￿)(2￿C + ￿)
> 0: (43)




4￿(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ s)f(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ 2s + s2)[(1 ￿ t)s ￿ (2 ￿ s2)] + 4s2 (1 ￿ s)g
(2￿C + ￿)D2 ; (44)
which is negative for 0 < s ￿ 0:85 independently of the values of ￿ and t and for 0:86 ￿ s < 1
provided that ￿ and t are such that ts(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿(s2 + s ￿ 2) >
(1￿s)(￿s3+4s2+2s￿4)
s2￿2s+2 (this
19condition is always satis￿ed for t ￿ 0:04).14;15 Finally, partial di⁄erentiation of ￿C from (39)





(2￿C + ￿)D2; (45)
where ￿ = D@N
@s ￿ N @D
@s which is equal to zero for
t =
s(2 ￿ f￿)(s3 ￿ 4s2 + 12s ￿ 12) ￿ 4(2s ￿ 5sf ￿ 2) ￿ s2f(s2 + 8f ￿ 2f2)
f (1 + ￿)[4(s ￿ 1) ￿ fs2]
+
+
f (2s3 ￿ s2 ￿ 4)
[4(s ￿ 1) ￿ fs2]
: (46)
For given t and ￿, (46) de￿nes the isovalue curve for ￿ = 0 in (f,s) space such that ￿C
decreases in response to an increase in s above the curve but increases below the curve. The
isovalue curve for t = ￿ = 0:10 is illustrated in Figure 1. Ceteris paribus, an increase in s
results in an increase in ￿ as
@t
@s





4f + fs3 ￿ 6 ￿ 6(1 ￿ s)
2￿￿
(1 ￿ s)
2 + (1 ￿ sf)
￿
[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]
f (1 + ￿)(4 ￿ 4s + fs2)
2 < 0; (47)




= 4￿(1 + ￿)
2f(fs
2 ￿ 4s + 4) > 0; (48)
so that ￿ > 0 (￿ < 0) above (below) a given t = k isovalue curve, for 0 ￿ k ￿ 1. At
values of f that yield interior solutions for ￿C, that is, for f > fL as de￿ned in footnote 12,
it then follows that
@￿C
@s < 0 above the isovalue curve (dark grey area) and
@￿C
@s > 0 below
the isovalue curve (light grey area); in other words, the market share of brand-name drugs
decreases (increases) as the two types of drugs become less di⁄erentiated at high (low) values
of s.
From (47), the isovalue curve for t = k shifts down as k increases; furthermore, from
@t
@￿
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
￿=0
= ￿
2fs4 ￿ 2(2 + f)s3 + [12 + f (2 ￿ f)]s2 ￿ 4(4 ￿ f)s + 4g
f (1 + ￿)
2 (4 ￿ 4s + fs2)
; (49)
14In the absence of a preferential treatment of generic drugs by insurance companies through a higher
coverage (that is, when t = 0), ￿ > (￿s
3+4s
2+2s￿4)
(s+2)(s2￿2s+2) for an increase in f to result into a decrease in ￿C; put
di⁄erently, at low values of ￿ and high values of s (0:02 ￿ ￿ ￿ 0:32 for 0:86 ￿ s ￿ 0:99), the monopolist opts
to supply to fewer types of consumers in response to an increase in production costs and/or a decrease in
the willingness to pay for drugs.
15See appendix for more details on @￿C
@￿ and @￿C
@f .
20which is negative for f < b f, the isovalue curve for t = k shifts up as ￿ increases for f < 1￿k
and down for f > 1 ￿ k. For a given ￿ (e.g., ￿ = 0:1 in Figure 1), the t = k isovalue curve




= 0, and downward for f > e f; hence,
the range of low values of s over which
@￿C
@s > 0 gets wider as f increases up to f = e f and
narrower for f > e f.16 The e⁄ects of changes in ￿ and t on how ￿C responds to a change in
s are illustrated in Figure 1a and Figure 1b. In Figure 1a, the t = 0:10 isovalue curve shifts
up when ￿ increases from 0:10 to 0:30 for 0 < f < 0:90 and it shifts down for 0:90 < f < 1;
the increase in ￿ also a⁄ects fL making it less likely for an interior solution to result at
combinations of low values of f and s. Overall, the region in which ￿ > 0, so that
@￿C
@s < 0,
decreases by A1 and the light grey area for f < 0:90 and it increases by the dark grey area
for f > 0:90; the region in which ￿ < 0, so that
@￿C
@s > 0, decreases by A2 but increases by
the light grey area for f < 0:90 and it decreases by the dark grey area for f > 0:90 (in A1
and A2, everyone buys brand-name drugs, that is, ￿C = 1). In Figure 1b, both the fL and
the t = k isovalue curves shift down when k increases from 0:10 to 0:30; the region in which
￿ < 0 thus increases by the dark grey area and A1 while the region in which ￿ > 0 decreases
by the dark grey area and increases by A2 (in A1 and A2, everyone buys brand-name drugs
when t = 0:10 but not when t = 0:30).17
In terms of market segmentation, the e⁄ect of heterogenous insurance coverage is am-
biguous; however, the following result obtains:
Proposition 4 For given ￿ and t, there exists an s￿ corresponding to each value of f such
that ￿B > ￿C for s > s￿ and ￿C > ￿B for s < s￿. As t increases, s￿ decreases; as ￿ increases,
s￿ increases for f < f￿ and decreases for f > f￿, where f￿ = 1 ￿ t.
When segmentation based on insurance coverage occurs in the absence of generic drugs, the
market share of brand-name drugs may increase in response to generic entry. Speci￿cally,
ceteris paribus, brand-name drugs are made accessible to more consumers (and thus to
consumers with lower coverage) following the introduction of generic drugs when the two
16See appendix for details on b f, e f, and the t = k isovalue curve.
17An increase in ￿ increases fL while an increase in t decreases fL. In terms of the isovalue curve in (f,s)
space such that f = fL for given ￿ and t, an increase in ￿ shifts the curve out while an increase in t shifts
the curve in. See appendix.
21types of drugs are more di⁄erentiated; as the pharmaceutical market becomes less pro￿table
(c " or ￿ # or both so that f "), generic drugs can be increasingly closer substitutes for
brand-name drugs, at least up to some critical value of f, and still trigger an increase in
the market share of brand-name drugs upon entry. However, the more favourable the co-
payment system is on the purchase of generic drugs relative to brand-name drugs (t "), the
more likely it is for some consumers to switch completely to generic drugs; on the other
hand, the smaller the market is (￿ "), the more (less) likely it is for some consumers to go
from buying nothing before generic entry to buying brand-name drugs after generic entry
for f < 1 ￿ t (f > 1 ￿ t).
With M denoting the di⁄erence between ￿N
D as above de￿ned (this ratio is equal to ￿B
A
from (35) and (36) written in terms of f and s under the restriction that q is such that
the price of brand-name drugs does not change in response to generic entry when insurance
coverage considerations are omitted from the analysis) and
2￿
f , so that ￿C > ￿B if M > 0
and vice versa, it obtains that M ￿ 0 for s ￿ s￿, where
s
￿ =
R + f [(1 + ￿)(3 + t) + 2] ￿ 8
2[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]
; (50)




2 and is thus independent of ￿ (e.g., in Figure 2a, s￿ = 0:9156 at f￿ = 0:90 for
any of the values of ￿ considered). For given ￿ and t, there is an s￿ curve below which ￿C > ￿B
and above which ￿B > ￿C; the s￿ curve reaches its maximum at s = 2 ￿
p
2 ￿ f2 (1 + ￿)
which is a positive function of f as drawn in Figure 2. The e⁄ects of changes in ￿ and t on




f (f ￿ 1 + t)[ft(1 + ￿) + f (1 ￿ ￿) + R]
[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]
2 R
; (51)




f (1 + ￿)[ft(1 + ￿) + f (1 ￿ ￿) + R]
2[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]R
> 0: (52)
Graphically, an increase in ￿ rotates the s￿ curve clockwise around f￿ so that the s￿ curve
moves up for f < f￿ and down for f > f￿ (Figure 2a); an increase in t shifts the entire
18See appendix.
22s￿ curve down (Figure 2b). With the lower-bound of f (fmin) also dependent on ￿ and t,19
changes in ￿ and t create or remove areas in which only corner solutions are feasible. In terms
of Figure 2a, for example, an increase ￿ from 0:1 to 0:3 results in the following changes: in
A1, the relationship ￿B > ￿C still holds but ￿B = 1; in A2, the relationship ￿B > ￿C no longer
holds and ￿B = ￿C = 1; in A3, the relationship ￿C > ￿B no longer holds and ￿B = ￿C = 1;
in A4, the relationship ￿C > ￿B still holds but ￿C = 1; in A5 and A6, the relationship shifts
from ￿B > ￿C to ￿C > ￿B but ￿C = 1 in A5; in A7, the relationship shifts from the ￿C > ￿B
to ￿B > ￿C. In terms of Figure 2b, an increase in t from 0:1 to 0:2 triggers the following
changes: in A1, the relationship shifts from the ￿C > ￿B to ￿B > ￿C; in A2, the relationship
￿C > ￿B still holds but ￿C is no longer equal to 1.
In general, the market share of brand-name drugs increases in response to generic entry
when s is relatively low and decreases when s is relatively high. In Figures 2c and 2d, ￿C and
￿B are drawn as functions of f for t = ￿ = 0:10 when the two types of drugs are considered
weak substitutes (e.g., s = 0:5 in Figure 3a) and when they are considered strong substitutes
(e.g., s = 0:9 in Figure 3b). Consistent with the results summarized in Figure 2, ￿C > ￿B,
which implies that the market share of brand-name drugs increases in response to the entry
of generic drugs, at any value of f when s is relatively low (Figure 3a), and ￿C < ￿B at
both high and low values of f when s is relatively high (Figure 3b). In both Figures, the
light grey area captures the extent to which the market share of brand-name drugs increases
as a function of f with the lower-bound value of f given by 0:41 (that is, fL as de￿ned
in footnote 12) in Figure 3a and by 0:18 (that is,
2￿
(1+￿)) in Figure 3b; the dark grey area
in Figure 3b captures the extent to which the market share of brand-name drugs declines
following generic entry.
Upon comparison of pC
b with pA
b (that is, the prices of brand-name drugs after and before
the introduction of generic drugs under the assumption that the entire market is served
when only brand-name drugs are available) and of pC
b with pB
b (that is, the prices of brand-
name drugs after and before the introduction of generic drugs under the assumption that





. An increase in ￿ increases both
2￿
1+￿ and fL. The
positive e⁄ect on fL, referred to in footnote 16, is given in the appendix and the e⁄ect on
2￿






23segmentation occurs even when only brand-name drugs are available), the following results
obtain:
Proposition 5 The generic competition paradox can arise both when segmentation occurs
before and after generic entry and when it only occurs after generic entry, although it is
more likely to arise in the latter case. When segmentation occurs before and after generic
entry, the paradox arises at high s, with increasingly higher s needed as f increases. When
segmentation only occurs after generic entry, the paradox arises at combinations of s and f
other than those involving either high s and high f or low s and low f.
Under the assumption that segmentation occurs prior to the entry of generic drugs (that is,
when pC
b and pB
b are compared), for a given additional coverage on the purchase of generic
drugs (i.e., for a given t such that the additional coverage is t￿) and a given market size (i.e.,
for a given ￿ such that the market size is 1 ￿ ￿), the higher the degree of substitutability
between brand-name and generic drugs, the more likely it is for the price of brand-name drugs
to increase following the introduction of generic drugs. This is consistent with the product
space di⁄erentiation explanations of past work, including Perlo⁄et al. (1995). Furthermore,
as production costs increase and/or the willingness to pay for drugs decreases (i.e., f "
such that the pro￿tability of the industry decreases through a closing of the gap between
willingness to pay for drugs and production costs), the degree of substitutability between the
two types of drugs has to be increasingly larger for the price of brand-name drugs to increase
following the introduction of generic drugs. Under the assumption that segmentation does
not occur prior to the entry of generic drugs (that is, when pC
b and pA
b are compared), for a
given t and ￿, the price of brand-name drugs decreases following the introduction of generic
drugs at either high values of both s and f or at low values of both s and f.
The above results are depicted in Figure 4 where the zero-price di⁄erential isovalue curves
are graphed in terms of s as a function of f for a given t and ￿. The pC
b ￿ pB
b = 0 curve
appears in the top left corner of the Figure and de￿nes, for f > 0:095 which is required for
￿B < 1, the light grey area within which the price of brand-name drugs increases following
the introduction of generic entry when market segmentation based on insurance coverage is
practised prior to the entry of generic entry. The pC
b ￿ pA
b = 0 curve appears in the top
24right and bottom left corners of the Figure and de￿nes the dark grey areas within which the
price of brand-name drugs declines independently of whether market segmentation based
on insurance coverage is practised prior to the entry of generic entry. For the bottom left
dark grey area, the relevant region for an interior solution for ￿C excludes sections U2 and
U3: in section U2, no solution for ￿C exists; in section U3, the only valid solution is ￿C = 1,
that is, a corner solution.20 The behavior of the price di⁄erential when the equilibrium is
characterized by a corner solution (in region U1, or the area to the left of the vertical line
at f = 0:095, and region U3 as illustrated in Figure 4) is described in Figures 4a and 4b
for t = ￿ = 0:05, with the light (dark) grey areas giving combinations of s and f for which
the price of brand-name drugs increases (decreases) in response to generic entry both when
market segmentation based on insurance coverage occurs prior to generic entry (in Figure
4a) and when it does not (in Figure 4b).21
Proposition 6 The generic competition paradox is more likely to arise at higher t and/or
lower ￿.
Under the assumption that segmentation occurs prior to the entry of generic drugs, the
higher the additional coverage on the purchase of generic drugs is (i.e., as t "), the lower is
the degree of substitutability between brand-name and generic drugs that is needed for the
price of brand-name drugs to increase following the introduction of generic drugs; conversely,
the smaller is the size of the market for drugs (i.e., as ￿ "), the higher is the degree of
substitutability between the two types of drugs that is needed for the price of brand-name
drugs to increase following the introduction of generic drugs. An increase in ￿ also results
in an increase in the lowest acceptable value of f (i.e.,
2￿
(1+￿)) so that, e⁄ectively, there exist
fewer combinations of values of s and f which give rise to the GCP. Under the assumption
that segmentation does not occur prior to generic entry, as t increases, the price increase
20In section U2, the necessary (but not su¢ cient) condition for ￿C > ￿, that is, D < 0, is violated. In
section U3, the condition for ￿C < 1, that is, ￿N
D ￿ (1 + ￿) < 0, is violated. In section U1, which is the area
to the right of f = 0:095, the condition for ￿B < 1, that is, f <
2￿
(1+￿), is violated.
21In both cases, ￿B = 1 in the shaded areas to the left of the vertical line at f = 0:095 while ￿C = 1 in the
shaded areas to the right of the vertical line at f = 0:095 and, for f ￿ 0:095, in the abde area and the left
light grey in the bottom left corner. In the light (dark) grey areas, pC
b is greater (lower) than pB
b in Figure
4a and greater (lower) than pA
b in Figure 4b. Furthermore, it can be shown that pB
b > pA













25is more likely to be observed (or, put it di⁄erently, increasingly lower values of s and f
are needed for the increase to occur). As ￿ increases, the increase is less likely to occur
(or increasingly higher (lower) values of s and lower (higher) values of f are needed for the
increase to occur).
The above results are depicted in Figures 5, 6a, and 6b where the zero-price di⁄erential
isovalue curves, expressed in terms of s as a function of f for given t and ￿, shift in the
directions of the arrows; hence, the GCPB and the GCPA areas (that is, the areas in which
the Generic Competition Paradox occurs in relation to CASES B and A) increase in response
to an increase in t (Figure 5) but decrease in response to an increase in ￿ (Figures 6a and
6b). The e⁄ects of an increase in ￿ are actually more complicated than above described; this
is because, as ￿ increases, fewer combinations of s and f yield an interior solution. Hence,
with the zero-price di⁄erential isovalue curve for an interior solution (and thus for f > 0:40)
shifting leftward, as indicated by the arrow in the top-left corner of Figure 6a, in response to
an increase in ￿, larger values of s are needed for given values of f in order for the price of
brand-name drugs to increase following generic entry in CASE B (that is, the GCP becomes
less likely to occur as re￿ ected by the area labelled U4). If corner solutions are however
accounted for, it is quite possible for the GCP to become more likely to occur. In Figure 6a,
the pC
b ￿ pB
b = 0 curves are given for ￿C = ￿B = 1 (shaded area to the left of the f = 0:40
line and below the ab segment), ￿ < ￿B < ￿C = 1 (shaded area between the f = 0:40
line and the bde segment), and ￿ < ￿C < ￿B = 1 (shaded area to the left of the f = 0:40
line and above the ab segment), and accordingly labelled, and de￿ne, under the assumption
that market segmentation is practised by the producer of brand-name drugs prior to generic
entry, additional areas in which the GCP occurs (light-grey areas excluding the area labelled
U4 which gives combinations of s and f such that the GCP occurs and an interior solution
results) and additional areas in which the GCP does not occur (dark-grey areas areas). In
comparison to Figure 4a, which gives information about when the GCP arises with a corner
solution in at least one of the two cases being compared (CASE B and/or CASE C) for
￿ = 0:05, the GCP results for an increasingly larger number of combinations of low values of
s and f as the area in which an interior solution for both cases obtains (that is, the area to
the left of the f = 0:40 line and below the ab segment) gets increasingly larger. In Figure 6b,
26the pC
b ￿pA
b = 0 curves are given for ￿C = 1 (area represented by U5+U6) and for ￿ < ￿C < 1,
and accordingly labelled. In comparison to Figures 4a and 4c, which give information about
the GCP when market segmentation is absent prior to generic entry for an interior solution
and a corner solution, there are increasingly more combinations of values of s and f yielding
an interior solution which do not give rise to the GCP (these additional combinations are
shown in the dark-grey area which excludes U7 and U5 as the former applies to the ￿ = 0:05
case as well and the latter applies for ￿C = 1). When corner solutions are considered (that
is, areas U5 and U6), there are however additional combinations of values of s and f (that
is, area U6) at which the GCP results.
3 Numerical Example
In this section, the price of brand-name drugs is computed for each of the above cases (A
through E) under the assumptions that ￿ = 10, which is non-consequential for the price
comparisons, and that t = ￿ = 0:05 (that is, the best available insurance package entails a
95 percent coverage for brand-name drugs and a 97.5 percent coverage for generic drugs).
Prices are reported for di⁄erent values of s (that is, for di⁄erent degrees of substitutability
between brand-name and generic drugs) and f. There are ￿ve tables, each corresponding to
a di⁄erent value of f; within each table, there are ￿ve di⁄erent values of s (￿rst column).
The lower-case letters in brackets next to the values of s are included in relation to Figure
7, which reproduces the relevant regions identi￿ed in Figure 4. In each table, information
is also included about the segment of the market serviced by the producer of brand-name
drugs when segmentation based on insurance coverage occurs (CASE B, in the absence of
generic drugs, and CASE C, in the presence of generic drugs). In CASES D and E, that
is, when insurance coverage considerations are ignored, the price of brand-name drugs is
not a⁄ected by the entry of generic drugs by construction (through the parameter q which
captures the perceived quality di⁄erential between brand-name and generic drugs) in order
for the relevance of insurance coverage heterogeneity in explaining the GCP to be fully
captured. Whenever the GCP arises, pC appears with the subscript i, where i = A if the
paradox occurs in relation to CASE A, i = B if the paradox occurs in relation to CASE B,
27and i = AB if the GCP arises independently of whether segmentation occurs prior to generic
entry. In some instances (those denoted with the superscript ￿), corner solutions prevail in
CASE C and both the price and the market share of brand-name drugs, pC and
￿C￿￿
1￿￿ , are
computed for ￿C = 1.
Table 1: Comparison of prices and market size when f = 0:15





0:15 (a) 10:27 12:63 10:53￿
A 5:75 0:79 > 1 0:78 1:00￿
0:25 (b) 10:27 12:63 N=A 5:75 0:79 N=A 0:78 N=A
0:50 (d) 10:27 12:63 N=A 5:75 0:79 N=A 0:78 N=A
0:75 (e) 10:27 12:63 17:81AB 5:75 0:79 0:54 0:78 0:52
0:95 (g) 10:27 12:63 35:05AB 5:75 0:79 0:33 0:78 0:29
N=A applies as ￿ > ￿C < 0.
Table 2: Comparison of prices and market size when f = 0:25





0:15 (h) 10:77 16:45 12:04A 6:25 0:61 0:86 0:59 0:85
0:25 (i) 10:77 16:45 10:73￿ 6:25 0:61 > 1 0:59 1:00￿
0:50 (j) 10:77 16:45 10:61￿ 6:25 0:61 > 1 0:59 1:00￿
0:75 (k) 10:77 16:45 17:87AB 6:25 0:61 0:52 0:59 0:49
0:95 (l) 10:77 16:45 32:37AB 6:25 0:61 0:33 0:59 0:29
Table 3: Comparison of prices and market size when f = 0:50





0:15 (m) 12:02 23:65 20:10A 7:50 0:42 0:49 0:39 0:46
0:25 (o) 12:02 23:65 18:16A 7:50 0:42 0:53 0:39 0:51
0:50 (r) 12:02 23:65 15:44A 7:50 0:42 0:62 0:39 0:60
0:75 (u) 12:02 23:65 17:95A 7:50 0:42 0:48 0:39 0:45
0:95 (v) 12:02 23:65 25:67AB 7:50 0:42 0:32 0:39 0:28
Table 4: Comparison of prices and market size when f = 0:75





0:15 (w) 13:27 29:33 25:74A 8:75 0:34 0:37 0:31 0:34
0:25 (y) 13:27 29:33 23:70A 8:75 0:34 0:39 0:31 0:36
0:50 (z) 13:27 29:33 19:72A 8:75 0:34 0:43 0:31 0:40
0:75 (aa) 13:27 29:33 17:89A 8:75 0:34 0:42 0:31 0:39
0:95 (ab) 13:27 29:33 18:96A 8:75 0:34 0:32 0:31 0:28
28Table 5: Comparison of prices and market size when f = 0:95





0:15 (ad) 14:27 33:29 29:49A 9:75 0:30 0:31 0:26 0:27
0:25 (ae) 14:27 33:29 27:23A 9:75 0:30 0:32 0:26 0:28
0:50 (ag) 14:27 33:29 22:24A 9:75 0:30 0:35 0:26 0:32
0:75 (ah) 14:27 33:29 17:64A 9:75 0:30 0:36 0:26 0:33
0:95 (ai) 14:27 33:29 13:59 9:75 0:30 0:30 0:26 0:26
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, the relevance of insurance coverage heterogeneity in explaining the generic
competition paradox, that is, the observation that the price of brand-name drugs increases
following the introduction of generic drugs, is examined in a two-stage game involving a
single producer of brand-name drugs and n quantity-competing producers of generic drugs.
Past theoretical work attempting to explain the paradox has relied on product di⁄eren-
tiation, exogenous market segmentation, and brand loyalty. Here we suggest that, even in
cases where di⁄erentiation and brand loyalty alone would not result in brand name price
increases, endogenous segmentation on the basis of insurance coverage by brand name pro-
ducers can reverse the decline in prices caused by generic competition. While empirical work
has indicated that insurance may play an important role in the paradox, no theoretical study
to date has examined the role of endogenous segmentation by insurance coverage.
In the model presented, when consumers are homogenous in their insurance coverage, the
generic competition paradox can arise provided that consumers￿perceived quality di⁄erential
between brand-name and generic drugs exceeds some threshold level which depends positively
upon the degree of substitutability between the two types of drugs and the willingness to
pay for drugs, and negatively upon marginal production costs. With the perceived quality
di⁄erential at a level which does not give rise to price increases following the introduction
of generic drugs when consumers have similar coverages (that is, with the brand loyalty
argument assumed away), heterogeneity in insurance coverage is shown to lead to the paradox
not only when market segmentation based on insurance coverage is absent in the pre-entry
stage, so that a price increase can be expected as a result of the market shrinkage due to the
segmentation, but also when market segmentation occurs prior to generic entry, although the
29paradox is less likely to arise in the latter case. In particular, and independently of whether
market segmentation is employed prior to generic entry, a price increase for brand-name
drugs is likely to result as generic drugs become available at combinations of high values of
s and low values of f, that is, when the two types of drugs are highly substitutable and the
market is pro￿table. When market segmentation does not occur prior to generic entry, the
parodox is also likely to arise at combinations of low values of s and high values of f, that
is, when the two types of drugs are highly di⁄erentiated and the market is not pro￿table.
While the extent of substitutability between the two types of drugs is an important factor in
the determination of how the price of brand-name drugs adjusts as generic drugs make their
way into the pharmaceutical market, although its e⁄ects runs counterintuitive with respect
to previous studies (e.g., Perlo⁄et al., 1995), market pro￿tability as captured by f is equally
important.
Within the context of our model with only interior solutions being considered, it is then
possible for the paradox to arise when the two types of drugs are highly substitutable in some
cases (consistent with other studies which rely on product di⁄erentiation) but not in other
cases, depending on how pro￿table the industry is. Furthermore, under the assumption that
market segmentation occurs only after generic entry, the paradox may arise when the two
types of drugs are either highly substitutable (and the industry highly pro￿table) or highly
di⁄erentiated (and the industry highly unpro￿table). The set of feasible combinations of
values of s and f (with s measuring product substitutability and f industry pro￿tability)
at which the paradox is observable is also dependent upon the size of the market (￿) and
the additional coverage on the purchase of generic drugs for a given insurance package (t).
Speci￿cally, as the market expands (this is equivalent to an improvement in the best insurance
package available) and/or insurance companies decrease deductables applied on the purchase
of generic drugs, the Generic Competition Paradox becomes more likely to arise.
In essence, at low levels of product di⁄erentiation, the producer of brand-name drugs
responds to generic entry by providing its product to fewer consumers (those with better
insurance coverage) and can thus supply it at a higher price; as the market becomes less
pro￿table and/or the best insurance package involves a lower coverage and/or the di⁄erence
in deductables between the two types of drugs decreases, the incentive to shrink the segment
30of the market buying brand-name drugs weakens making the GCP less likely to occur.
On the other hand, at high levels of product di⁄erentiation, the producer of brand-name
drugs responds to generic entry by o⁄ering its product to more consumers, and must thus
charge a lower price, when it practises market segmentation prior to generic entry but to
fewer consumers, and can thus charge a higher price, when it does not practise market
segmentation prior to generic entry. In the latter case, as the market shrinks in terms of
insurance packages available (with the best coverage decreasing) and/or insurance companies
o⁄er a lower deductable on the purchase of generic drugs, the incentive to supply to fewer
consumers weakens so that the GCP becomes less likely to occur or, equivalently, the GCP
is more likely to arise when the market is not pro￿table.
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345 APPENDIX
INTERIOR SOLUTION OF ￿C: Conditions
From (39), an interior solution of ￿C, that is, ￿ < ￿C < 1, requires that 2￿
2 < ￿N
D < (1 + ￿),
where N and D are given in (40) and (41). Speci￿cally, D < 0 for ￿C > 0, ￿N
D ￿ 2￿
2 > 0
for ￿C > ￿, and ￿N
D ￿ (1 + ￿) < 0 for ￿C < 1. With fL and fH denoting values of f solving
￿N




(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s)(4￿ + 2s) + s(4￿ ￿ 2s)
s(4￿ ￿ 2s) ￿ (1 + ￿)(2 ￿ s)[(1 ￿ t)s ￿ (2 ￿ s2)]
and
fH =
￿2(1 + ￿ + ￿s)(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) ￿ 2(1 + ￿)s + 2￿s2
￿(1 + ￿)(2 ￿ s)[(1 ￿ t)s ￿ (2 ￿ s2)] ￿ 2(1 + ￿)s + 2￿s2;
the following obtains: (i) for f < fL < fH, ￿N
D < 2￿
2 < (1 + ￿); (ii) for fL < f < fH, 2￿
2 <
￿N
D < (1 + ￿); (iii) for f > fH > fL, ￿N
D > (1 + ￿) > 2￿
2. Hence, when CASES B and C are
compared, that is, when segmentation based on insurance coverage occurs both before and








1+￿ required for an interior solution of ￿B, while the upper-bound value (fmax) is given
by fmax = min(fH;1). When CASES A and C are compared, that is, when segmentation
occurs only after generic entry, fmin = fL and fmax = min(fH;1). It turns out that, unless t
and ￿ are excessively high, fH > 1 over the entire range of values of s so that fmax = 1.
For given t and ￿, the above fL expression can be solved for s as a function of f such







(￿s4 ￿ 6s2 + 6s3 + 4s)t + (s ￿ 1)(s2 ￿ 2)(s ￿ 2)
2￿






2(4￿ + 2￿s2 ￿ 4￿s + s3 + 2s ￿ 4s2)s(s ￿ 2)(1 + ￿)
(2￿st ￿ ￿s2t + ￿s3 ￿ ￿s2 + 4￿a ￿ 4s + 2st + 4 ￿ 3s2 ￿ s2t + s3)
2 < 0;
an increase in ￿ (t) results in a rightward (leftward) shifting of the ￿C = 1, thus making an
interior solution less (more) likely to attain.






> 2￿s[(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) ￿ s(1 ￿ f)]





D2, then (1 + ￿)￿
2
C > 2￿s[(2 ￿ s)(1 ￿ s) ￿ s(1 ￿ f)] N
D2 and
@￿C
@￿ > 0. Upon manipulation of (39),







































which is positive as, for an interior solution, ￿C < 1.
PROPOSITION 3: Sign of
@￿C
@f
By (44), the sign of
@￿C
@f is equal to the sign of
A1 = (1 + ￿)
￿
2 ￿ 2s + s
2￿￿





2 (1 ￿ s):
As [(1 ￿ t)s ￿ (2 ￿ s2)] < 0, A1 is maximized when ￿ = t = 0. For ￿ = t = 0,
A1 =
￿
2 ￿ 2s + s
2￿￿
s ￿ 2 + s
2￿
+ 4s
2 (1 ￿ s);
which is negative for s < 0:8536345110 and positive for 0:8536345110 < s < 1. For
0:8536345110 < s < 1,
@￿C
@f < 0 if ts(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿(s2 + s ￿ 2) >
(1￿s)(￿s3+4s2+2s￿4)
s2￿2s+2 . The
inequality is least likely to hold when its left-hand side is mimimized (that is, when ￿ = 0)
and its right-hand side is maximized (that is, when s = 0:9248386528). For ￿ = 0 and
s = 0:9248386528, the inequality is always satis￿ed provided that t > 0:03878582123.
PROPOSITION 3: Isovalue curve t(￿;f;s) = k
With t(￿;f;s) de￿ning the solution to ￿(￿;f;s;t) = 0, which is explicitly given in (46), the









(￿f2 ￿ ￿f2 + 4f)s6 + (4￿f2 ￿ 16f ￿ 8)s5 + (￿4￿f2 + 48f + 40)s4
f2(1 + ￿)(fs2 ￿ 4s + 4)2 +
+
(64f + 128)s3 + (12f2 + 4￿f2 + 16f + 224)s2 ￿ (16f2 + 16￿f2 + 160)s
f2(1 + ￿)(fs2 ￿ 4s + 4)2 +
+
16f2 + 16￿f2 + 32
f2(1 + ￿)(fs2 ￿ 4s + 4)2
and ts (￿) is given in (47). As ts (￿) is always negative and tf (￿) > 0 for f < e f, where
e f = ￿
2
q
(s4 ￿ 4)(s4 ￿ 4s3 + 12s2 ￿ 16s + 4)(s ￿ 2)
2 [s2 + 2(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ s)]
(1 + ￿)(s6 + 16s ￿ 16) + 4s2 [￿(￿s3 + s2 ￿ 1) ￿ 3]
+
+
2s2 (s4 ￿ 4s3 + 12s2 ￿ 16s + 4)
(1 + ￿)(s6 + 16s ￿ 16) + 4s2 [￿(￿s3 + s2 ￿ 1) ￿ 3]
;
it obtains that ds









0 < f < 1 ￿ k, the isovalue curve t(￿) = k lies above the f = b f curve, where
b f =
￿s2 + s + 2 ￿
p
2s4 ￿ 6s3 + 9s2 ￿ 12s + 8
s
;











(> 0) for f < b f (f > b f) and ts (￿) < 0, an increase in ￿ triggers an upward (downward)









the s as a function of f that solves








when f = 0 or f = 1 ￿ k; by concavity

















for 1 ￿ k < f < 1.
PROPOSITION 4: Slope of s￿




R + f [(1 + ￿)(3 + t) + 2] ￿ 8
2[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]
;
as per (50), with
R =
q
f8 ￿ f [(1 + ￿)(3 + t) + 2]g
2 ￿ 8[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2][f (1 + ￿)(f + t) ￿ 2] > 0;
22It can easily be shown that
@
2f














2(s ￿ 2)[s2 ￿ 4s + f2 (1 + ￿) + 2]






2[s2 ￿ 4s + f2 (1 + ￿) + 2]





(s2 ￿ 4s + 6 ￿ 2f)[f (1 + ￿) ￿ 2]
(s ￿ 2)
2 f (1 + ￿)
:
For s = 2 ￿
p
2 ￿ f2 (1 + ￿), ds￿





[f(1+￿)￿2][f2(1+￿)+2f￿4] < 0, so that s￿ is







and decreasing for f 2
￿q
￿s2+4s￿2
1+￿ ;1
￿
.
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